As satellite navigation becomes increasingly vulnerable to interference, the reliability of systems we depend on to move people, goods and services is being challenged.

In a 2026 case published by the International Marine Contractors Association, a vessel in the Red Sea appeared on its electronic chart to be dozens of miles from its actual position, with its displayed speed jumping from 12 to 39 knots. The captain recognised the anomaly and switched to manual navigation. The vessel reached its destination safely, but the incident illustrates how technology designed to provide situational awareness can itself become a source of misinformation.

The disruption is not limited to maritime operations. In April 2024, two Finnair flights from Helsinki had to return after GPS interference prevented them from landing at Tartu Airport in Estonia. Finnair subsequently suspended its daily flights to Tartu for a month while an alternative approach system was established.

Interference with satellite navigation systems is becoming an increasingly recognised safety and operational concern, particularly in and around conflict-affected regions.

Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), including GPS and Galileo, underpin much of modern transportation. Beyond helping aircraft and ships establish their positions, they provide precise timing information used by numerous onboard and ground-based systems.

When signals disappear – or tell the wrong story

There are two principal forms of interference: jamming and spoofing.

Jamming involves overwhelming satellite signals with radio interference, preventing receivers from obtaining reliable positioning information. Spoofing is potentially more deceptive: counterfeit signals cause a receiver to calculate an incorrect position or time.

The distinction matters. With jamming, a system may recognise that it has lost a signal. With spoofing, information can appear legitimate even when it is wrong. The challenge is therefore not just losing access to information, but knowing whether the information being received can be trusted.

The growing threat has prompted action across the aviation sector. The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has identified increasing interference across regions including the Baltic Sea, Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. In July 2026, it updated its safety guidance, addressing pilot and air traffic control communications, operational procedures and training.

EASA and EUROCONTROL have also developed a joint action plan to strengthen the resilience of European aviation operations.

A vulnerability that extends beyond aviation

While aviation has attracted considerable attention, maritime operations face equally important challenges.

A September 2026 report by the Royal Institute of Navigation, based on research involving more than 300 vessel captains and maritime professionals, highlighted how interference can affect modern ships beyond their primary navigation systems.

An important finding was the extent to which satellite-derived positioning and timing information has become embedded in other onboard equipment. Systems supporting communications, distress alerts and navigation may share dependencies that are not always obvious to operators. This creates the possibility of interconnected failures: interference affecting one source of information can have consequences for several systems that depend on it.

For vessels operating in affected areas, unreliable positioning can complicate navigation, communication and emergency response.

The International Maritime Organization, together with the International Civil Aviation Organization and International Telecommunication Union, has already called for stronger protection against interference, recognising its implications for international transportation and safety.

The wider implications for security and travel

For organisations operating internationally, GNSS interference introduces another dimension to travel and operational risk management.

A destination may remain accessible, while the routes used to reach it are affected by interference. An aircraft may need to divert, vessels may face navigational challenges, and resulting disruptions could affect personnel, logistics and business continuity.

There is also an important consideration for organisations responsible for monitoring personnel movements. This does not mean that aircraft, ships or tracking systems become incapable of functioning when satellite navigation is disrupted. Alternative navigation methods and procedures exist. However, organisations need to understand their limitations and have appropriate contingency arrangements in place.

For corporate security teams and Global Security Operations Centres (GSOCs), this means monitoring interference, assessing its potential impact on personnel and operations, and factoring possible disruption into travel and security decisions.

Rethinking our dependence on technology

Technology has made transportation more efficient and precise, but it has also created dependencies that are easily overlooked until something goes wrong. For organisations, the challenge is understanding how disruptions to systems such as GNSS could affect their operations, particularly when tracking travellers, assessing exposure and coordinating assistance.

Building resilience into travel risk management and emergency response planning is therefore essential. GSOCs should monitor where GNSS interference is occurring, assess its potential impact on travel routes and destinations, and establish alternative ways of verifying a traveller's location. This could include direct communication with the traveller, local security contacts, transport providers and other trusted sources of information.

Organisations should also ensure that escalation procedures account for navigation disruptions, unexpected diversions and unreliable tracking data. Travellers operating in higher-risk areas should know how to report their location, recognise potential disruption and contact the security team if normal navigation or communication services are affected.

Ultimately, effective security operations are not defined by the technology available to them, but by how well they respond when it cannot be relied upon. Preparedness, verification and sound human judgement remain essential to protecting people and maintaining business continuity.